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mala malca · Pridružen/-a: 07.11. 2006, 04:56 Prispevkov: 17767

Large quantities of goods were in Britain or in transit when Washington suddenly and unexpectedly terminated Lend-Lease on 2 September 1945. These items were sold to Britain for about 10 cents on the dollar with payment to be stretched out over 50 years at 2% interest. [4] The loan originally was £1,075 million. The final payment of $83.3 million (£42.5 million) due on the 31 December 2006 (repayment having been deferred on several occasions) was made on 29 December 2006, it being the last working day of the year. After this final payment Britain's Economic Secretary, Ed Balls, formally thanked the US for its wartime support.

According to the lend-lease agreements with the Soviet Union, all weapon systems delivered were to be returned to the USA after cessation of hostilities or destroyed under American supervision. A large number of aircraft (including recent deliveries of P-39s, P-63s and P-47s) were destroyed by bulldozers. Many naval vessels were returned to USA in the late 1940s, but a significant number of lend-lease aircraft were still in use in Russia in the early 1950s. After almost 50 years, the unsettled lend-lease accounts are still affecting American-Russian relations.

PIZDA,TRDIŠ DA SE DEŽELA V KATERI SLUŽIŠ LJUBI KRUHEK PRODAJA ZA DROBIŽ!!! DA TE NI SRAM!
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Hja,prjatu,če bi ti jaz povedu kako je v Rusiji ,bi bil ti na drugi strani,bi bili naš sovražnik,te sedaj ne bi bilo...

Ivan Maček - Matija

mala malca · Pridružen/-a: 07.11. 2006, 04:56 Prispevkov: 17767

US deliveries to USSR
American deliveries to the Soviet Union can be divided into the following phases:

"pre Lend-lease" 22 June 1941 to 30 September 1941 (The Soviets did pay in gold)
first protocol period from 1 October 1941 to 30 June 1942 (signed 1 October 1941)
second protocol period from 1 July 1942 to 30 June 1943 (signed 6 October 1942)
third protocol period from 1 July 1943 to 30 June 1944 (signed 19 October 1943)
fourth protocol period from 1 July 1944, (signed 17 April 1945), formally ended 12 May 1945 but deliveries continued for the duration of the war with Japan (which the Soviet Union entered only 8 August 1945) under the "Milepost" agreement until 2 September 1945 when Japan capitulated. 20 September 1945 all Lend-Lease to Russia was terminated.
The list 1 below is the amount of war matériel shipped to the Soviet Union through the Lend-Lease program from its beginning until 30 September 1945.

Aircraft 14,795
Tanks 7,056
Jeeps 51,503
Trucks 375,883
Motorcycles 35,170
Tractors 8,071
Guns 8,218
Machine guns 131,633
Explosives 345,735 tons
Building equipment valued $10,910,000
Railroad freight cars 11,155
Locomotives 1,981
Cargo ships 90
Submarine hunters 105
Torpedo boats 197
Ship engines 7,784
Food supplies 4,478,000 tons
Machines and equipment $1,078,965,000
Non-ferrous metals 802,000 tons
Petroleum products 2,670,000 tons
Chemicals 842,000 tons
Cotton 106,893,000 tons
Leather 49,860 tons
Tires 3,786,000
Army boots 15,417,001 pairs
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Hja,prjatu,če bi ti jaz povedu kako je v Rusiji ,bi bil ti na drugi strani,bi bili naš sovražnik,te sedaj ne bi bilo...

Ivan Maček - Matija

matt · Objavljeno: 27 Feb 2007 09:25 Naslov sporočila:

idiot. jest povzemam NJIHOVO mnenje (poisc dokic mortgaged to yanks).

to kar tle navajas, nima veze s tem kar jest govorim.
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mala malca · Pridružen/-a: 07.11. 2006, 04:56 Prispevkov: 17767

matt · Objavljeno: 28 Feb 2007 02:08 Naslov sporočila:

zdej pa nehi srat. pocak na zakljucni stavk:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3Fqr0FiwZLY

wanker.
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mala malca · Pridružen/-a: 07.11. 2006, 04:56 Prispevkov: 17767

matt · Objavljeno: 28 Feb 2007 02:42 Naslov sporočila:

dej citirej me, drkadzijo. ti MEN podtikas laz.

a ti moram prevest? no, pocak da dajo gor cel dokic.
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mala malca · Pridružen/-a: 07.11. 2006, 04:56 Prispevkov: 17767

matt · Objavljeno: 28 Feb 2007 03:06 Naslov sporočila:

kot sem reku, pocak na film.

kljucno je leto 1947.
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mala malca · Pridružen/-a: 07.11. 2006, 04:56 Prispevkov: 17767

matt · Objavljeno: 28 Feb 2007 03:24 Naslov sporočila:

ni poanta v dolgu, pac pa o aranzmajih in dodatnih ultimatih (npr konvertibilnost)

mah poglej film k bo prsu.
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matt · Objavljeno: 13 Mar 2007 00:48 Naslov sporočila:

Pa da zakljucim tole (ne da se mi cakat da en nalima gor na youtube)

http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/article1265277.ece

From The Sunday Times
December 31, 2006
Farewell to Britain’s US mortage from hell
We should learn from the cold calculation America showed after the war, says Sir Christopher Meyer
At midnight tonight the Bank of England will transfer $83m (£42.4m) to the US Federal Reserve. This will be a historic moment: the last repayment of the loan that the United States made to Britain in 1946 and the final chapter in the story of Britain’s alliance with America in the second world war.

The negotiation of the loan is a tale of high drama. When I got involved in making a documentary about it I found myself, a former diplomat and historian, immersed in a narrative of endless fascination. It involves a human tragedy. John Maynard Keynes, Britain’s principal negotiator and perhaps the foremost economist of his time, was broken by his failure to get the only deal he felt was just or prudent. It illuminates the unsentimental reality of diplomatic bargaining between even the closest of allies. And, 60 years later, it still teaches lessons about the “special relationship” between Britain and America.

For much of the second world war the US supported Britain through the Lend-Lease programme. This delivered billions of dollars of military equipment, goods and food in return for leases on British military bases around the world. Without it our war effort would have been crippled. As it was, by the end of the war in 1945, we were exhausted and bankrupt. Two world wars in 30 years — a total of 10 years’ fighting — had broken us.

On August 17 1945 the Americans announced, suddenly and unexpectedly, their intention to end Lend-Lease with retroactive effect from VJ-Day, two days previously. This was shocking news for Britain’s new socialist government under Clement Attlee. To almost universal surprise, especially in America, Attlee had emphatically defeated Britain’s war hero, Winston Churchill, at the July 1945 general election.

This was the first Labour government with an overall majority in the House of Commons. It had ambitious plans to rebuild Britain: to create a welfare state, to put in place free health care for all, and to nationalise Britain’s main industries. It was this promise to build a New Jerusalem that had won Attlee the election. But it would be expensive; and there was little money in the bank. Labour’s eyes turned immediately to the US, Britain’s wartime partner and the richest country on earth.

In September 1945 Keynes was instructed by the cabinet to go to Washington and to return with a grant, or gift, of $5 billion. Keynes convinced Attlee’s ministers that he could get the grant. Underlying Keynes’s confidence and that of the cabinet was a belief that the Americans owed us the money: that because the US had come “late” into the war at the end of 1941, while we had been fighting for almost two years, some of the time alone, it had a moral obligation to give us a large grant, no strings attached.

But what Keynes called his “Justice gambit” provoked acrimony on both sides, furious mutual attacks and criticism in the press, parliament and Congress. His bid for a $5 billion grant became an Anglo-American agreement on a $3.75 billion loan fixed at 2% over 50 years (we are discharging the loan a few years late). This was a better deal than returning GIs got and Churchill had to be called in to persuade a reluctant Congress to ratify it.

In cabinet discussion of American insistence on a loan Ernie Bevin, Attlee’s foreign secretary, talked of Shylock. An American congressman accused Keynes of being a communist. It was as if there had never been the intense comity and co-operation of the wartime years.

The stress of negotiation, and of selling its outcome to a bitterly disappointed cabinet and parliament, killed Keynes, who was enfeebled by heart disease. The affair left behind a sour taste in the mouths of many in Britain, not least because the Americans used the loan to force Attlee to make the pound sterling freely convertible by 1947. In a world that wanted only the mighty dollar this was disastrous for Britain.

The first of several post-war sterling and balance-of-payments crises rapidly occurred as people rushed out of sterling into dollars. The result was more hardship and rationing. It wrecked the Attlee government’s economic planning, already burdened by the decision to rearm with nuclear weapons.

But it is important to hear the American side of the story. In my documentary, Mortgaged to the Yanks, Karl Rove, President George W Bush’s chief political adviser, and Rich Armitage, Colin Powell’s deputy secretary of state, point out that the Americans too had made enormous sacrifices, bearing the brunt of war on the western and Pacific fronts.

The value of Lend-Lease to Britain was massive; and we were not the only country to benefit. The Soviet Union’s war effort would also have been hamstrung without it. With the arrival of peace the American people and Congress expected their government to focus resources back home, not on a foreign socialist government, as hundreds of thousands of American servicemen were demobbed and looking for jobs.

What emerges with the greatest clarity from the American interviews is that, however deep and sincere the esteem for Britain, sentiment will not trump what the Americans deem to be in their national interest. That interest is a shifting amalgam of things, made up of the instincts of heartland America, attitudes in Congress, a hard-headed cost/benefit analysis of this or that course of action, and the ambitions and aims of the president and his administration. It is no law of nature that the American national interest will automatically coincide with that of the UK.

None of this is rocket science. Nor, because of the deep unpopularity of Britain’s alliance with the US in Iraq, does it call for a strategic realignment of our foreign and security policy on Europe. Only the naive would consign the country’s security to the flabbiness of European solidarity; witness the lukewarm support from France and Germany for our soldiers in Afghanistan. Britain has never needed to make a fundamental choice between Europe and America and we should not make one now.

What is required today, more than ever in a confusing age of globalisation, interdependence and transnational issues, is a renaissance of the idea of national interest; the skill to define it sensibly and pragmatically; and a tough-minded realism about how we pursue it with friends and adversaries alike. How else will we survive and prosper when the nations that will define our children’s world (the US, China, Japan, India, Russia) pursue single-mindedly their own national interest?

This is the necessary context in which the “special relationship” must be placed and judged. It remains a relationship, thank God, of great natural intimacy with a unique closeness in many areas. But it is not one in which the normal rules governing relations between states are suspended. It is not a relationship that since 1945 has defied the laws of diplomatic gravity. On the contrary, like many of our other relationships, it has had its ups and downs, starting 60 years ago with a row between a president (Truman) and a prime minister (Attlee), both of whom were new to their jobs and had no personal relationship.

After the turbulence of 1945/46 what got the British-American relationship back on track? The national interest, of course. As it dawned on America that the real threat to its security was Stalin’s Russia, it devised the Marshall Plan as an economic bulwark against the further spread of communism. Britain became a prime beneficiary and America’s closest cold war ally. It was pure Palmerston. As Britain’s Victorian foreign secretary once famously said: “We have no eternal allies and no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow.”

Mortgaged to the Yanks is on BBC4 on Wednesday at 9pm
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mala malca · Pridružen/-a: 07.11. 2006, 04:56 Prispevkov: 17767

ja,ja...sej je znano da je GB polna nacističnih in komunističnih simpatizerjev...naj bbc naredi oddajo o tej temi,če upa...sam kokr vem avtobiografij si nekak ne prvošjo-... Applause

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Hja,prjatu,če bi ti jaz povedu kako je v Rusiji ,bi bil ti na drugi strani,bi bili naš sovražnik,te sedaj ne bi bilo...

Ivan Maček - Matija

matt · Objavljeno: 13 Mar 2007 01:42 Naslov sporočila:

Je ze bla .. ne spomnim se naslova .. ok blo jih je vec.
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mala malca · Pridružen/-a: 07.11. 2006, 04:56 Prispevkov: 17767

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